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Evaluating and enhancing resilience in water infrastructure is a crucial step towards more sustainable
urban water management. As a prerequisite to enhancing resilience, a detailed understanding is required
of the inherent resilience of the underlying system. Differing from traditional risk analysis, here we
propose a global resilience analysis (GRA) approach that shifts the objective from analysing multiple and
unknown threats to analysing the more identifiable and measurable system responses to extreme
conditions, i.e. potential failure modes. GRA aims to evaluate a system's resilience to a possible failure
mode regardless of the causal threat(s) (known or unknown, external or internal). The method is applied
to test the resilience of four water distribution systems (WDSs) with various features to three typical
failure modes (pipe failure, excess demand, and substance intrusion). The study reveals GRA provides an
overview of a water system's resilience to various failure modes. For each failure mode, it identifies the
range of corresponding failure impacts and reveals extreme scenarios (e.g. the complete loss of water
supply with only 5% pipe failure, or still meeting 80% of demand despite over 70% of pipes failing). GRA
also reveals that increased resilience to one failure mode may decrease resilience to another and
increasing system capacity may delay the system's recovery in some situations. It is also shown that
selecting an appropriate level of detail for hydraulic models is of great importance in resilience analysis.
The method can be used as a comprehensive diagnostic framework to evaluate a range of interventions
for improving system resilience in future studies.
© 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.1. Introduction
There is an emerging realisation that building resilience is an
important component of enhancing the sustainability of many
systems, including water systems (Ahern, 2011; Pickett et al., 2014).
Engineering resilience can be broadly characterised in two related
but distinct ways: attribute-based and performance-based. The
former typically concerns the system as a whole and could be
considered as a set of design principles, such as the degree of
interconnectedness or duplication, which enables the system toontfort University, Mill Lane,
, University of Exeter, North
.diao@dmu.ac.uk (K. Diao), C.
exeter.ac.uk (R. Farmani), G.
Ward), D.Butler@exeter.ac.ukrespond appropriately to any threat. The latter refers to the agreed
performance of the system (or part of the system) in responding to
a particular threat. It is therefore typically prescriptive (i.e.
standard-based) and refers to an operational goal (Butler et al.,
2014). The degree to which the various attributes of a system
build the standard of performance required is still a matter of on-
going research but this requires a detailed understanding of
whole-system resilience.
In this paper, emphasis is placed on understanding the perfor-
mance of water systems under unexpected or deteriorating con-
ditions (beyond failure) and resilience is defined here as the degree
to which the system minimizes level of service failure magnitude
and duration over its design life when subject to exceptional con-
ditions (Butler et al., 2014, 2016). This definition is broadly in line
with emerging policy and practice (NIAC, 2009; Ofwat, 2012). As a
prerequisite to enhancing resilience, a detailed understanding is
required of the inherent resilience of the underlying system and
that is the focus of this paper.
There area number of key challenges to overcome when
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 How to link threat to impact
 How to deal with different threats that produce the same impact
 How to deal with similar threats that produce different impacts
 How to envisage all possible threats that may affect the system
 How to handle unknown threats.
Risk analysis (e.g. all-hazards approach, ASCE Policy Statement
518, 2006; NIAC, 2009; Cabinet Office, 2011) is a typical method
to study threat-impact relationships, but is unable to address un-
known threats (Hughes and Healy, 2014). A promising way to
overcome this problem is to focus on the system, and direct
attention to all possible failure modes rather than speculate on all
possible threats. Pipe failure in water distribution systems, for
example, is a failure mode that may result from various internal
(e.g. water hammer) or external threats (e.g. ground movement).
Each failure modemay be considered a ‘stress’ on the systemwhich
results in performance ‘strains’ (Johansson, 2007; Hokstad et al.,
2013). Each failure mode encompasses multiple failure scenarios:
in the example of the ‘pipe failure’ failuremode, for instance, failure
scenarios would include every potential combination of pipe fail-
ures in the network. Each stress may also vary in magnitude e for
example from 0% pipe failure to 100% pipe failure. Failure scenarios
and their resulting performance strains (measured in terms of
impact/level of service), therefore, can span from high probability,
routine failures (such as a single pipe failure) to low (or even un-
known) probability total failures. As threats with low probability
(e.g. Canadian snow storm in 1998, North American blackout 2003,
and earthquake followed by a tsunami in Japan 2011) do happen
from time to time it is important to include these high stress sce-
narios when evaluating resilience (Johansson et al., 2013). With
regard to events where the probability of a scenario is incalculable,
this is precisely where a ‘resilience’ approach is of greatest benefit
e risk cannot be calculated but that does not mean that such oc-
currences should be ignored, and resilience assessment provides a
tool by which they can be considered. Identification of failure
modes, failure scenarios and stress magnitudes requires no
knowledge of the causal threat or threats. The full range of per-
formance strains resulting from any stress magnitude can, there-
fore be evaluated even when there are unknown threats.
This type of approach has been adopted as part of the global
vulnerability analysis (GVA) method, used to assess the vulnera-
bility of power grids and water distribution systems (Johansson,
2007; Johansson and Henrik, 2010; Johansson et al., 2013;
Hokstad et al., 2013). For each failure mode, the method can
identify: the range of strain magnitude (minimum and maximum)
that can result from a given stress magnitude, the stress magnitude
the system can withstand before reaching a certain level of service
reduction and the existence of thresholds where a slight increase in
stress gives rise to much more severe strains (Johansson, 2007;
Hokstad et al., 2013). In a similar way, Gheisi and Naser (2014)
explored water distribution system (WDS) reliability in relation to
pipe failure mode. In their study, the performance of alternative
WDS layout designs was tested under an increasing number of
simultaneous failed pipes. The corresponding strain frequency and
magnitude was then measured. However, these previous studies
did not model the recovery of the system from failure or measure
the strain duration. Thus, these methods cannot be directly applied
to comprehensively evaluate the resilience of WDSs.
There have been a few attempts to identify the single failure
mode scenarios to which the WDS is most vulnerable. Typically,
these studies target identification of the minimum stress magni-
tude that results in the maximum strain, instead of focusing on an
overview (e.g. identification of full range of strains at any givenstress magnitude). For example, in terms of pipe failure, Berardi
et al. (2014) applied an evolutionary algorithm to identify sce-
narios that have a minimum fraction of failed pipes, yet result in
maximum shortage of water supply (e.g. isolation of connections to
all water sources). For the same purpose, Kanta (2006), Bristow
et al. (2007) and Kanta and Brumbelow (2013) studied pipe fail-
ure mode during fire fighting and identified its maximum strain.
This paper proposes a method that builds on GVA, called global
resilience analysis (GRA), which is designed to assess the whole-
system resilience of engineering systems. GRA is applied in this
paper to WDSs and in a complementary paper to urban drainage
systems (Mugume et al., 2015). GRA resilience analysis of a water
distribution system has not been attempted before. As such, this
study addresses potential large magnitude system failures which
have not been captured in any previous analysis, in addition to the
lower magnitude/higher probability events already studied. Of
course, high stress scenarios are highly improbable and it is likely
that decision makers will focus on the lower magnitude/higher
probability events. However, there are examples of low probability,
high consequences events inwater distribution systems, e.g. a large
number of pipe failures following a number of days below zero
temperature or an earthquake. Hence, we cannot be blind to the
fact that extreme events can occur, and this study evaluates the
maximum theoretical level of service that may be maintained in
such instances. There may also be scenarios in which failure of
additional components results in no further impact. Therefore, to
achieve a comprehensive view, it is important to consider as many
scenarios as possible. GRA has been attempted in the context of
urban drainage (Mugume et al., 2015) but this study includes
specific consideration to both structural and functional failures (see
below for definitions of these). Moreover, this study applies an
improved failure scenario sampling technique which includes tar-
geted failures in addition to the random failures. This enriches the
sample and increases the capture of critical scenarios, particularly
those resulting in distinctive high and low strains. In contrast to the
methods reviewed above, GRA measures both strain (level of ser-
vice) magnitude and duration under stresses, allowing a compre-
hensive picture of system resilience to be built up. Failure scenarios
over extended periods (Francis and Bekera, 2014) are modelled for
the failure mode. Metrics are based on model simulation results
rather than graph theory, as is the case in GVA. This paper describes
the GRAmethod developed and its application to four different case
studies. Three different failure modes are considered and resilience
curves built, compared and contrasted.2. Method
2.1. Global resilience analysis
A system's inherent resilience is evaluated by modelling the
basic failure modes with increasing stress magnitude and esti-
mating the corresponding strains that arise (Johansson, 2007;
Hokstad et al., 2013). The method includes the following steps:
Step 1. Identify the failure mode to be considered (e.g. structural
failure, excess demand); this study selects three WDS failure
modes, of which details are provided in subsection “Failure
modes selected”.
Step2. Identify the system stress associated with the failure
mode and the way to simulate it (e.g. WDS simulation with
excess load at a node for a specified period);
Step 3. Identify the appropriate system strain and how to mea-
sure it (e.g. ratio of unsupplied demand to the total demand
required in the strain duration);
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magnitude (0%e100%of maximum stress). Whilst extreme
stress magnitudes of up to 100% may be highly improbable,
they are theoretically possible andmust, therefore, be included
if the full range of potential impacts is to be identified. For any
given stress magnitude, an appropriate number of failure
scenarios is determined. This must be sufficient to reflect
important variations in the analysis, but cannot include every
possibility due to the huge number of possible failure sce-
narios. In this study, the number of failure scenarios is deter-
mined and samples generated as follows:
Assume c is the total number of components and cf the number
of failed components (i.e. the magnitude of stress). If only one
component in the system fails (cf ¼ 1), this may be any one of the
total set of c components and the total number of potential sce-
narios is c. When all components fail (cf ¼ c), there is only one
possible scenario.
Given 1 < cf < c, two types of scenario are included in the
sample development: random failure and targeted failure. Targeted
failures are used to enrich the random sample and reduce the
potential of missing critical scenarios, particularly those resulting
indistinctive high and low strains. The random failure scenario
picks all locations of the cf failed components randomly, and each
scenario is unique. Simulation of the random failure scenarios is











here, nR is the number of random failure scenariosmodelled at each
stress magnitude; N is the total number of possible scenarios for a
failure mode; p is the probability of success. In this study, p
is regarded as the probability of successful hydraulic simulation
since hydraulic simulationmay fail under a large stress magnitude
(i.e. scenarios with failed simulation are invalid and the strains are
not calculated). A value of p ¼ 0.5 is assumed to provide
the minimum sample size required. CI is the confidence interval;
Za is the normal distribution value for a given confidence level
(e.g. 1.645 at a confidence level of 90%, 1.960 at 95%, and 2.575 at
99%).
The targeted failure scenarios where 1 < cf < c are built up
incrementally by selecting cf failed components one by one
(Albert et al., 2000; Holme and Kim, 2002; He et al., 2009). Two
different selection strategies are applied, resulting in two groups
of targeted failure scenarios with an equal number of scenarios.
One group is started by first selecting the individual component
whose failure results in the greatest strain, and vice versa for the
other group (i.e. select the component resulting in lowest). If there
are multiple components causing the same level of strain, or no
component causing any strain, one is randomly selected (He et al.,
2009). At each subsequent selection (e.g. the cf th), (cf  1) failed
components have been already selected, and only one more
component (i.e. the cfth failed component) is selected from
remaining unselected components {i.e.
j
c ðcf  1Þ
k
}. Hence, to
consider all possible locations of the cfth failed component, the
total number of targeted failure scenarios (nI) should be
2
j
c ðcf  1Þ
k
at any given number of (1 < cf  c) failed compo-
nents. As a complementary method to random failure, the tar-
geted failure scenarios have beenwidely used in complex networkscience for exploring the resilience and/or robustness of the net-
works to failures at specific locations, e.g. target attack (Albert
et al., 2000; Holme and Kim, 2002; He et al., 2009).
The total number of failure scenarios for evaluation is therefore
cþ (nR þ nI)þ 1, where c is the total number of scenarios with only
one component failed (cf ¼ 1); (nR þ nI) the number of scenarios
with more than one but less than all components failed
(1 < cf < c); and 1 the number of scenarios with all components
failed (cf ¼ c).
As an example, consider the resilience of a WDS with 428 pipes
to the pipe failure mode (i.e. c ¼ 428). The number of failure sce-
narios should be calculated for all possible magnitudes of stress,
from a single pipe failure (cf ¼ 1) to failure of every pipe
(cf ¼ c ¼ 428). There are 428 (¼c) possible single pipe failure sce-
narios, and one scenario when all pipes fail.
When 1 < cf < c, the number of scenarios is the sum of random
failure scenarios (nR) and targeted failure scenarios (nI). The number
of random failure scenarios (nR) required is calculated as follows for















The number of targeted failure scenarios is
nI ¼ 2
j
428 ðcf  1Þ
k
, i.e. 854 for cf ¼ 2, 852 for cf ¼ 3, etc.
Therefore, (nR þ nI) ¼ 1242  2cf.
To sum up, the number of scenarios encompassing all stress
magnitudes is:8<
:
428; cf ¼ 1
1242 2cf ; 1< cf < c
1; cf ¼ 1
and the total number of scenarios is therefore 1671  2cf.
Step 5. Generate a resilience stress-strain curves showing the
mean, maximum and minimum strains generated from the
simulations for any given stress magnitude.2.2. Failure modes selected
Failuremodes inWDSs can be broadly categorised as either: (a) a
structural failure, which results from malfunction of system com-
ponents, or (b) a functional failure,where the emphasis is on system
resilience under loading conditions beyond the design envelope
(Mugume et al., 2015). In this work, three different failure modes
are considered in order to evaluate WDS resilience from differing
perspectives. These are pipe failure, excess demand, and substance
intrusion. Responses to systematic pipe failure can reveal the
resilience of the system to the loss of physical connectivity (struc-
tural). Responses to excess demand indicate resilience to additional
point loads without structural failure (functional). Responses to
substance intrusion reflect resilience of the system to water quality
disturbance without a change of system structure or hydraulic
loading. Hence, WDS resilience is comprehensively evaluated in
terms of structure and function. For each case, the specific evalua-
tion method is described. Investigating different failure modes
individually helps us to distinguish the systems' dynamic response
to specific failures. This is critical before moving to more compli-
cated cases. Evaluation of multiple, simultaneous system failure
modes (e.g. pipe failure and loss of power) is beyond the scope of
this particular paper but a topic of further, ongoing research.
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In this failure mode, the stress is modelled by changing the
status of pipes to completely closed for a duration of 3 h. This is an
attempt to simulate the isolation of failed pipes (loss of connec-
tivity) followed by repair within three hours (i.e. the typical no-
penalty maximum response time for UK water service providers).
The simulation is a simplification of a real pipe failure and does not
include the process from occurrence of pipe failure (e.g. pipe burst)
to detection and complete isolation. Thus, water loss before pipe
isolation is not modelled. Failed pipes are considered as isolatable
shortly after breakage, and hence the ‘pipe failure’ has been
modelled by closing the pipes rather than opening them and
allowing outflows to drain into the surroundings until tanks are
emptied. The stress magnitude is the percentage of pipes failed,
represented by red crosses in Fig. 1. Although pipe bursts typically
occur during periods of low demand, pipe failure may result from a
range of internal and external threats and can potentially occur at
any time. In the simulation, pipe failure is, therefore, introduced to
coincide with the peak demand period and so capture the
maximum potential impact. The strain magnitude is assessed by
calculating dDf, the ratio of unsupplied demand to the total demand
during strain duration (Eqs. (3) and (4)). The strain duration is the
time between the first occurrence of supply failure and the final
return to a non-failuremode. Time to strain is also measured, and is
the time between the first application of the stress (i.e. start of pipe
failure) and the first occurrence of supply failure resulting from the
stress. For cases when a given magnitude of stress causes no strain,
time to strain is not calculated.
qiðtÞ ¼
0
@ PiðtÞ< ¼ 0 : 00< PiðtÞ< Pmin : diðtÞ½PiðtÞ=Pmin1=2















where di(t)d the expected nodal demand to supply at junction i at
time t; Pi(t)d the actual pressure at junction i at time t; Pmind the
minimum allowed pressure at junction i (20 m for nodes withFig. 1. Schematic of the three failure modes and corresponding failure scenarios. Crosses
substance intrusions respectively.demand, and 0 m for nodes without); qi(t)d the estimated actual
supplied nodal demand at junction i at time twhen there is no pipe
failure; qi,f(t)d the estimated actual nodal demand at junction i at
time t in failure scenariof; TSSd start time of the strain; TSEd end
time of the strain; Nd the total number of junctions.
2.2.2. Excess demand e fire fighting
This failure mode represents the effects of incrementally loading
the WDS with excess nodal demands, above and beyond the
nominal loading case. The stress is simulated by adding excess
demandswith specifiedmagnitude and duration, such as those that
might be experienced under fire fighting conditions, to nodes, (as
illustrated by flames in Fig. 1). To enable comparison of the systems'
resilience on a like-for-like basis, the stress is a 6 h duration fire
flow of 26.67 L/s (€ONORM B 2538, 2002) (equivalent to 422.73 US
gallon/minute) for all systems, irrespective of the system's design
criteria. The percentage of nodes subject to this additional demand
represents the stress magnitude. The introduction of the demand is
timed to coincide with the normal peak demand period. Whilst it is
recognised that occurrence of fires may reduce normal demand,
this is not guaranteed and the assumption of normal demand en-
ables identification of critical scenarios. For example, a 100% stress
magnitude does not necessarily mean that the whole city is ablaze:
there may be several large fires which necessitate the use of every
hydrant but normal demands still occur in unaffected areas.
The strain magnitude is assessed by calculating the ratio of the
mean number of nodes with pressure deficiency at any time step
during the strain duration to the total number of nodes. For nodes
with demand, the pressure is regarded as insufficient if it is <17 m
(€ONORM B 2538, 2002) during fire fighting or <20 m (Marchi et al.,
2014; Giustolisi et al., 2015) after fire fighting. For nodes without
demand, the pressure is regarded as insufficient if it is 0 m
(Marchi et al., 2014; Giustolisi et al., 2015). The strain duration is the
time between first occurrence of insufficient node pressure
resulting from the stress and the final recovery to sufficient pres-
sure at all nodes. Time to strain is the time from when fire fighting
starts to occurrence of first pressure deficiency caused by the stress.
2.2.3. Substance intrusion
This stress is simulated by imposing a 25 g substance mass, flames and arrows represent the location of pipe failures, increased demands and
K. Diao et al. / Water Research 106 (2016) 383e393 387booster source at individual nodes for a duration of 2 h from the
beginning of the simulation period (Zechman, 2011). Water supply
is regarded as uncontaminated when a substance concentration is
compliant with EU drinking water quality standards A threshold of
<250 mg/L is used as applied to common substances such as
chloride and sulphate [European Union (Drinking Water)
Regulations, 2014]. The specific substance mass was chosen in or-
der to 1) represent a substantial water quality deterioration
violating the EU standard (i.e. 10 times the threshold value at
source); 2) expose differences among systems and 3) avoid exten-
sive computational load (high mass requires much longer simula-
tion times as the system recovers much more slowly). The stress
magnitude is modelled by the percentage of nodes to which an
intrusion source is administered, represented by arrows in Fig. 1.
The strain magnitude is evaluated by calculating the ratio of the
volume of non-compliant water supply to the total water supply
volume in strain duration. The strain duration is the time from first
occurrence of non-compliant water supply until all water supplies
in the system completely satisfies the threshold. In this study the
intrusion is assumed to be undetected, and hence no emergency
controls that may speed up recovery of the systems, are modelled.
Hence, recovery of the systems depends solely on the system
properties. Time to strain is the time from when substance intru-
sion starts to occurrence of contaminated supply.
A computer program was developed in C# to implement the
GRA method for the three failure modes. The program generates
failure mode scenarios by adding stresses in a WDS model through
editing the model's input file. It then calls the EPANET engine
(Rossman, 2000) for hydraulic and water quality simulation (de-
mand-driven) of the scenarios. Based on simulation results, strain
magnitude and duration are measured. Note that scenarios in
which EPANET cannot solve the hydraulic equations (e.g. due to ill-
conditioned equation systems) are omitted from the results plots.
Analysis shows that these scenarios can be significantly different
and do not result from failure of a group of critical elements. Hence,
this is a weakness of the current numerical computation technique
we used, and improving the fundamental hydraulic calculation
scheme is out of the scope of this study. A pressure-driven model
was also trialled but eventually discarded due to issues of conver-
gence failure.
In the EPANET simulation, default settings are used (e.g. head-
loss formula, hydraulic time step) for hydraulic computation of all
simulated WDSs. For the water quality simulation, the transport
and decay of substances is modelled based on the principles of
conservation of mass coupled with reaction kinetics (Rossman
et al., 1993;Rossman and Boulos, 1996). The chosen settings for
substance reaction in EPANETare: Bulk Reaction Order¼ 1.0; Global
Bulk Coefficient ¼ 1.0 (Rossman, 2000). Due to the high compu-
tational load of the water quality analysis, the maximum allowable
water quality time step is used, i.e. the same as the demand pattern
time step (e.g. 30 min or 1 h, depending on the model used).3. Case studies
Four WDSs of different sizes and configurations were used as
case studies and their properties and configurations are summar-
ised in Fig. 2 and Table 1. The case study networks have been used
as benchmarks for WDS studies on water quality (Ostfeld et al.,
2008), calibration (Ostfeld et al., 2012), optimal design (Marchi
et al., 2014; Giustolisi et al., 2015), and cascade failures (Sitzenfrei
et al., 2011; Diao et al., 2014a). No modifications were made to
the properties of the networks.4. Results and discussion
This section illustrates the GRA results and discusses how they
can contribute to the management and operation of water distri-
bution systems. Each failure mode is first analysed individually and
then the common features are explored.
The GRA results for the three failure modes are presented in
Figs. 3e5, showing the magnitude of stress applied against the
magnitude of strain on the system. The plots show the mean (dash
dot), maximum (solid) and minimum (dash) relationships between
stress and strain.
4.1. Pipe failure
In the case of pipe failure, the GRA curves (Fig. 3) indicate that
the worst case WDS response to pipe failure is complete loss of
water supply in all of the case studyWDSs. Strain duration is either
the same as the duration of pipe failure (i.e. 3 hrs) or slightly longer
(e.g. 1 hr more). Time to strain (level of service failure) ranges from
0 h to 2 h. Thus, all four systems currently lack resilience to this
failure mode, and the strain starts and stops immediately or shortly
after pipe failure starts and ends, respectively. Specifically, the
maximum strain curves of all systems (the solid lines in Fig. 3) rise
sharply to reach the global maximum supply shortage (100%).
Hence, failure of just a small fraction of pipes (approx. 6% for Net3;
5% for BWSN network 1; 29% for the Alpine network; and 25% for C-
Town) can disrupt the systems' water supply entirely.
The results imply that, in each system, only a few pipes repre-
sent the most critical hydraulic links, e.g. trunks connecting reser-
voirs to the rest of the system. For instance, duplication of only 9
pipes [Fig. 4(A)] can dramatically increase the resilience of Alpine
network to low stress yet high probability events [Fig. 4(B)]. These
pipes are chosen via clustering analysis, as described by Diao et al.
(2014a). Contrarily, failure of a large number of pipes does not
necessarily result in catastrophic impacts. For instance, Net3 can
still deliver 86% of total demand with 70% of pipes failed if critical
pipes remain undamaged (shown in Fig. 3). The revealed criticality
of pipes can guide investments in operation and maintenance and
emergency planning (e.g. for pipe burst). Critical pipes are priori-
tized for protection. Uncritical pipesmay be ideal sites for operation
and maintenance control due to the low impact of disconnecting
them. For example, those pipes can be closed to isolate a burst pipe
nearby in emergency planning. Therefore, they can be ideal places
to install isolation valves. As a result, the system can fail as planned
tominimize the impacts. Based on the results, budget for increasing
resilience to pipe failure can therefore be efficiently allocated.
Note that the analysis results may also be affected by the level of
detail of the hydraulic models. Alpine and C-Town, for instance,
reaches the maximum impact under a relatively large stress
magnitude (29% and 25% respectively) in comparison with Net3
and BWSN network 1 (6% and 5%). This may be attributed partially
to the greater detail in the Alpine and C-Town models. These two
networks have a mean pipe length of 130 m (max 1600 m),
compared with 562 m (max 3127 m) for Net3 and 224 m (max
13868 m) for BWSN Network 1. Consequently, failure of a pipe in
Net3 or BWSN Network 1 may actually represent loss of an entire
supply path. Loss of all connections in a trunk model does not
necessarily mean failure of every individual pipe e instead, it
represents loss of all paths to water sources due to failure of any
pipes on those paths. Furthermore, increasedmodel detail may lead
to a larger number of possible scenarios, which in turn increases the
difficulty of finding the most extreme scenarios. In this regard, it
may be worthwhile starting the GRA with a trunk model, and then
changing to detailed model (e.g. all-pipe model) if necessary (e.g.
for detailed analysis of parts of the system found to be critical).
Fig. 2. Case study water distribution systems.
Table 1
General properties of the case study networks.
Networks Net 3 Alpine BWSN1 C-Town
No. of Nodes 91 127 126 388
No. of Links 115 157 168 429
No. of Reservoirs 2 2 1 1
No. of Tanks 3 4 2 7
No. of Pump stations 2 3 2 5
Simulation duration (hrs) 24 75 96 168
System mean demand (L/s) 717.3 6.36 56.37 170.16
Total tank volume (L) 28,621,000 732,358 35,148,000 9,496,639
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As shown in Fig. 5, the basic level of service (i.e. nodal pressures
<17 m during firefighting and <20 m after) is breached for all the
WDSs, although this occurs at various fractions of nodal coverage
and has widely different strain durations starting at different times
after the commencement of firefighting. Indeed, the systems each
have very different response curves to these excess nodal demands.
The strain magnitude of Net3remains near zero (i.e. no or
marginal level of service drop) until a large stress magnitude
(number of fire fighting nodes) is imposed (i.e. 22% for maximum;
42% for mean; 68% for minimum), and so is considered highly
resilient. Beyond this threshold, the lines then increase gradually
and converge to a 65% loss of service when all nodes are stressed.
The strain duration is no longer than 6 h, i.e. the duration of the fire
fighting stress, and there is no strain when the magnitude of fire
fighting stress is below 6%. Clearly, Net3 has a large buffer capacity
to meet fire fighting demands that are relatively small with regard
to the high demands of the system, e.g. system mean
demand ¼ 717.3 L/s. Quantifying the buffer capacity will also
facilitate evaluation of the ability of WDSs to handle any demand
uncertainties. With the exception of cases in which there is nostrain (i.e. time to strain does not exist), the time to strain is either 2
or 0 h.
The BWSN network1 is also resilient to fire fighting stress, with a
service drop threshold at 22%formax; 23% for mean; 55% formin. In
contrast, the BWSN network1 has a much longer maximum strain
duration (24 h) than Net3 (2 h), whilst it can absorb a much larger
magnitude of fire fighting stress (16%) without any strain. Again, for
scenarios with strains, the maximum time to strain of BWSN
network1 is as long as 6 h, while that of Net3is only 2 h [Fig. 5]
when the stress magnitude falls between 17% and 47%. However,
strain in BWSN network1 begins earlier (maximum time to
strain ¼ 0 h) than in Net3 (maximum time to strain ¼ 2 h) for a
larger magnitude of fire fighting stress afterwards. Given these
comparisons, it can be concluded that even for the same failure
mode, a system can be more resilient than another with respect to
one measure of strain and less resilient with respect to another.
Even for the same measure of strain, a system can be more resilient
than another under only a certain range of stress magnitudes and
vice versa. These facts demonstrate the necessity of GRA, showing
that analysis of a few scenarios which address only a limited range
of potential stress magnitudes and types may not reveal the full
dynamic of a system's response and tipping points.
Alpine and C-Town have low or even no buffer capacity to
widespread excess demands, exhibiting rapid increases in strain
over approximately the first 10% of stress. Correspondingly, the
strain duration increases sharply to maxima (i.e. 7 and 17 h for
Alpine and C-Town respectively) at only 2% (Alpine) and 5% (C-
Town) node coverage. Nevertheless, the time to strain of the two
systems has a large range as well, although they cannot absorb any
magnitude of fire fighting stress with no strain. For example, in
some cases the strain on C-Town does not occur until 83 h (Fig. 4)
after the stress was imposed.
The exceptionally long strain durations in BWSN and C-Town are
attributed to the long recovery time of only a few nodes. The long-
lasting pressure deficiencies at those nodes result from drained
Fig. 3. GRA curves for pipe failure.
Fig. 4. Enhancement of the Alpine network resilience to pipe failure by twinning critical pipes.
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This is understandable as the WDSs are not sized to cope with
exceptional high impact failures. However, this also implies that
increasing capacity may not necessarily enhance resilience, since
dramatically increased capacity (e.g. tank size) may still be too
small to reduce impacts of high stress, and worse prolong the re-
covery time significantly after removal of the stress (e.g. due to the
longer time taken to refill large tanks). Furthermore, increased
hydraulic capacity may have negative effects on water quality andthis should be fully explored before implementing such in-
terventions to increase resilience to excess demand. Hence, in-
crease of capacity should be very carefully planned. To shorten
recovery time, more operational options (e.g. more available pumps
to increase pumping capacity) would be more feasible and cost-
efficient as emergent post-stress responses. For instance, by add-
ing one pump at the water source in BWSN Network 1 (with the
same property as the original one, PUMP-172) [Fig. 6(A)] and
running it for 5 h (hours 38e43) after fire-fighting, the maximum
Fig. 5. GRA curves for excess demand (firefighting).
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guideline for resilient design of WDSs is definitely required, since
such an extra pump would not be regarded as necessary if failure
scenarios were not considered. This also demonstrates that
assessing resilience enhancement due to implementation of
different interventions should include properties and performance.
For this failure mode, the level of model detail may also affect
the analysis and results. In less-detailed models, many locations of
hydrants maybe missing and therefore use of multiple nearby hy-
drants for fire-fighting cannot be modelled. In all pipe models,
nodes configured with hydrants should be identified as it may not
appropriate to assume a hydrant is available at every node. Hence,
the appropriate level of model detail is an area for future explora-
tion, and knowledge of all hydrant locations is a prerequisite.4.3. Substance intrusion
Fig. 7 shows GRA curves for the four networks in response to
substance intrusion events. For this failure mode, time to strain is
regarded as 0 for all cases, as substance intrusion starts at the very
beginning of the model simulation. Hence, it is not included in
Fig. 7.
There is variety in these curves indicating resilience to sub-
stance intrusion is very system specific. For instance, the maximum
strain magnitude (i.e. percentage of contaminated water supply)ranges from 1.5% (Net3) to 100% (Alpine). The maximum strain
duration ranges from 3 h (Net3) to 140 h (C-Town). Net3 is the most
resilient to substance intrusion, followed by BWSN network1. The
high flow rates due to large water demands in these two networks
dilute the concentration of substance. As for the other two, C-Town
has a lower maximum strain magnitude (57%) than Alpine (100%),
but a longer maximum strain duration (140 h compared with 42 h).
The large variation in strain durations may attributed to different
reasons. For instance, the long strain duration of C-Town may be
explained by the wide spread of tanks over the network, each of
which needs a long time to recover once contaminated. Accord-
ingly, the maximum strain duration of C-Town can be shortened to
100 h by isolation of all tanks from the beginning of the intrusion
until the system recovers. To meet the demands, however, the
backup pump (PU3) at the water source needs to be switched on
until the system recovers.
As for water quality monitoring and control, the results provide
some clues for sensor placement. For instance, the maximum
impact in Alpine increases rapidly and exceeds80% contamination
when the stress magnitude is only 6%. This indicates that a few
nodes once polluted will have broad impact on the system. Hence,
those nodes can be good candidates for sensor placement.
Contrarily, the maximum impact in BWSN Network 1 and C-Town
increases gradually, which is an indicator of good resilience. How-
ever, it reveals no node is significantly more important than any
Fig. 6. Shortened recovery of the BWSN following excess demand by increasing
pumping capacity.
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analysis (e.g. intrusion of different substances) may have to be done
to identify suitable sites for sensors.
Regarding the level of model detail, models containing all pipes
are required for accurate evaluation of resilience to substance in-
trusions, as it is unrealistic to model pollution of a pipeline several
thousand meters long (e.g. as in BWSN network 1) becoming
polluted in one time-step. However, water quality simulation for
such a detailed model could be very time consuming. A trade-off
between accuracy and efficiency may be necessary, and therefore
requires further future research.4.4. Common features
For all the three failure modes, there were some common
features:
The range of strain magnitude first increased as stress magni-
tude increased and then reduced after the stress magnitude passed
a threshold (different from system to system and failure mode to
failure mode), finally converged when the wholeWDSs were under
stress.
The same magnitude of stress could result in very different level
of strains, as shown by the gap between maximum and minimum
curves. For instance, the strain magnitude resulting from single
pipe failure varies from 0% to about 40% in Net3 and BWSN
network1, 0e15% in C-Town, and 0e10% in Alpine. Moreover, it
ranges from nearly 0% to 100% when the fraction of pipes failed
reaches 40% in Net3 and Alpine and 20% in BWSN network1; and
from nearly 9% to 100% in C-Town with 10% of pipes failed. As
discussed before, these big gaps reveal the existence of critical
scenarios and the different levels of model detail. For instance,
when 70% of pipes fail Net3 can be completely out of service (100%
supply shortage) or still deliver about 86% of total demand,
depending on the location of the failed pipes. The latter scenario
meets the majority of demands with a tremendously highproportion of pipes failed because there is no pipe failure in the
backbone (Diao et al., 2014b, 2015) formed by themost critical links
connecting critical infrastructures (e.g. reservoirs, tanks, pump
stations, large customers). Hence, enhancing the resilience of
backbones to failure is crucial. For the other two failure modes,
different combinations of failed components can lead to consider-
ably varied strains as well. For the excess demand, the strain
magnitude can range from 3.3% to 32% at a stress magnitude of 74%
in Net3, and from 0% to 19% at a stress magnitude of 56% in BWSN
network1, and from 46% to 90% at a stress magnitude of 47% in
Alpine. For the substance intrusion, the range of strain magnitude
at a stress magnitude of 70% varies from 3.4% to 21.6% for BWSN
network 1, from 53% to 100% for Alpine and from 13.5% to 57% for C-
Town.
Increased resilience to one failure modemay decrease resilience
for another. For instance, although tanks enhance flexibility and
capacity to meet demand [e.g. as temporary water sources when
the reservoir(s) is disconnected], they could be a negative factor
regarding resilience to substance intrusion. This is demonstrated in
C-Town, where the wide spread of several tanks can either prevent
supply shortage resulting from pipe failure (i.e. give zero strain) or
delay the occurrence of supply shortage (e.g. time to strain ¼ 2,
Fig. 3). Contrarily, once those tanks are contaminated, the sparse
spatial distribution of them may facilitate diffusion of contami-
nated water within the system, and results poor resilience to
contaminant intrusion (as illustrated by the 140 h recovery time in
Fig. 5).
Additionally, given that this study investigates resilience to
specific failuremodes, it is expected that the results may differ from
those obtained using other resilience indices. Whilst a comparison
would be interesting, it is beyond the scope of this work.
5. Conclusions
This paper proposes a new method, global resilience analysis
(GRA), and applies it to water distribution systems (WDSs). The
GRA described evaluates the resilience off our benchmark systems
to three different failure modes, those being pipe failure, excess
demand (e.g. firefighting), and substance intrusion. A failure mode
includes all scenarios of the system under a particular stress,
regardless of what threat(s) causes the stress. The GRA results are
presented in a series of plots which show the relationship between
stress magnitude and multiple indicators of strain. From exami-
nation of the results of the GRA for each failure mode and WDS, it
can be concluded that:
1) GRA can identify: (i) the level of resilience of the same system to
different failure modes; (ii) the level of resilience of different
systems to the same failure mode; (iii) the range of strains
(minimum and maximum) which may result from any given
level of stress; (iv) the stress magnitude the system can with-
stand before reaching a certain level of service reduction; (v) the
existence of thresholds where a slight increase in stress gives
rise to more severe impacts; and (vi) scenarios which result in
the minimum and maximum strains, which can reveal combi-
nations of components whose failure would lead to marginal or
considerable strains. Therefore, this method can be used as
comprehensive diagnostic framework linking system attributes
(e.g. connectivity and capacity) to performance (e.g. level of
service) to evaluate how best to build whole-system resilience
based on multiple system failure modes in future studies.
2) The GRA illustrates the similarities or differences in complex
dynamic responses of different systems to various failure
modes. For different failure modes, a system can be more
resilient to one failure mode than another system while be less
Fig. 7. GRA curves for substance intrusion.
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system can be more resilient than another system with respect
to one measure of strain and less resilient with respect to
another. Even for the same measure of strain, a system can be
more resilient than another under a certain range of stress
magnitude and vice versa.
3) The GRA results reveal that increased resilience to one failure
mode may decrease resilience to another. For example, tanks
enhance flexibility and capacity to meet demands [e.g. as tem-
porary water sources when the reservoir(s) is disconnected], yet
they could be a negative factor regarding resilience to substance
intrusion (e.g. take very long time to recover once
contaminated).
4) Extreme scenarios identified (e.g. those with very high or low
impacts) can guide resilience enhancement, and be used to
ensure systems fail as planned during unexpected stresses. For
instance, in some scenarios failure of a small number of critical
components (e.g. 5%) may disable the entire system for water
supply, whilst in other scenarios 80% of demandmay still bemet
when 70% of components have failed. Hence, different operationand maintenance strategies can be tailor-made for critical and
uncritical components.
5) Increasing capacity (e.g. by increasing tank size) may not always
improve resilience, and may even prolong the system's recovery
time significantly following removal of the stress. It is therefore
necessary to assess both the properties and performance of any
intervention designed to improve resilience.
6) The level of detail of hydraulic models may affect the GRA re-
sults, and therefore the level of model detail required should be
further explored for different failure modes.Acknowledgements
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